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FORFEITURE LAW, THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S
EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE, AND UNITED
STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Bajakajian,1 the Supreme Court struck down a
forfeiture as "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment for the first
time. This decision came as part of a long line of cases involving the
constitutionality of different statutory forfeiture provisions. In these
previous cases, the Court held that the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendments operate to limit the Government's ability to interfere
with the right to property through the mechanism of forfeiture. How-
ever, even though the Court applied the Eighth Amendment to pro-
tect the right to property, in reality the protections it provided were
limited. In Bajakajian, the Court expanded the Eighth Amendment's
protections on property using the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.
In addition to the right to property, the Court held in earlier
decisions, in the context of capital punishment, that the Eighth
Amendment serves to protect the right to life, but offered little or no
protection for liberty. When these earlier decisions are combined
with the holding in Bajakajian, the outcome is stark-the Eighth
Amendment protects life and property, but not liberty. How this re-
sult occurred is the subject of this Case Comment.
This Case Comment will discuss forfeiture law, the Bajakajian de-
cision, and the effect the case will have on the criminal justice system.
In particular, Part II of this Case Comment will provide an overview of
forfeiture law, including the historical roots of forfeiture law and the
distinction between criminal and civil forfeiture. It will also discuss
the various statutory forfeiture provisions and the constitutional limi-
tations on forfeiture, looking particularly at the Eighth Amendment
and how the circuit courts have applied it. Part III of this Case Com-
ment will discuss Bajakajian and the decisions by the district court, the
Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court. Finally, Part IV will discuss the
1 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
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effects that the Bajakajian decision will have on how the courts will
analyze and decide forfeiture cases under the Eighth Amendment. It
will also question the limited protections provided by the Eighth
Amendment and its effect of making property a more constitutionally
sacred right than liberty.
II. FORFEITURE LAW
A. Historical Roots of Forfeiture Law
Forfeiture is rooted in biblical law,2 ancient Greek and Roman
law, and early English law.3 Under English law, some of these early
forfeiture laws were known as "deodands." Deodands were enforcea-
ble against the property itself and not its owner. The English medie-
val law of deodand held that when an inanimate object or an animal
caused the death of a person, that object was forfeited. 4 In early
times, the object was sold and the proceeds went to pay for masses for
the dead. Subsequently, the Crown took the proceeds.5 The guilt or
innocence of the property owner was irrelevant; the law viewed the
object as being guilty itself. That distinction is still reflected in the
law.
Also under English law, forfeiture might be imposed after convic-
tion of a felony or treason. The law of attainder provided that a per-
son found guilty of treason automatically lost all her civil rights and
her property was forfeited to the Crown. Using the same idea, per-
sons convicted of a felony other than treason had their chattels for-
feited to the Crown. Under the Corruption of Blood laws, the heirs of
a person convicted of a felony also lost all their rights to the convicted
person's property.
6
These early forfeiture laws gave rise to the English admiralty laws.
Among them was the Navigation Act, which required the forfeiture of
all vessels, including cargo, that were not made, manned, or owned by
British men.7 These forfeiture actions could be brought against either
the property or the owner. Typically, they were brought against the
property, because the owners were overseas and thus not subject to
2 See Exodus 21:28 ("If an ox gore a man or woman, that they die: then the ox
shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall
be quit.").
3 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 8 (1881).
4 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-83 (1974).
5 See id. at 681.
6 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *374--81.
7 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261.
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the jurisdiction of the English courts. Therefore, in rem forfeiture
was the only way that England could enforce these admiralty laws.8
English forfeiture law was unpopular with the colonists, as re-
flected in the Constitution and subsequent early legislation. The Fifth
Amendment requires due process of law as a protection of property,9
Article III specifically forbids automatic forfeiture for treason,10 and
Article I outlaws bills of attainder." In the Act of April 30, 1790,12 the
First Congress outlawed forfeiture of a defendant's estate after convic-
tion of a felony.
American forfeiture law expanded after the Civil War. Using the
military power in Article I, Congress passed the Confiscation Act that
authorized forfeiture prosecution against property owned by rebel
soldiers.' 3 The Government sought forfeiture of rebel-owned land lo-
cated in the North, while the owners were located in the South. Thus,
like England's forfeiture laws, the Confiscation Act could only be en-
forced against the property.14 The Court justified the Act constitu-
tionally by saying that the forfeitures were intended to put an end to
the war, not to punish the individual rebels.' 5 Looking past the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause to the War Provision, the Court viewed
the forfeitures as being against the South, rather than against the
landowners.
16
In rem forfeiture was also used during Prohibition to suppress
the illegal alcohol trade. These forfeitures were challenged as uncon-
stitutional, but were upheld based on the use of in rem forfeiture dur-
ing the Civil War. 17 The requirement that the forfeiture be in time of
war was forgotten and the groundwork for the expansive use of forfei-
ture was in place.
8 See id. at *262.
9 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or [shall any person] be deprived
of... property, without due process of law.... .").
10 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare
the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during Life of the Person attainted.").
11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.").
12 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (repealed 1987) ("no conviction of
judgment... shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate").
13 See generallyjAms RANDALL, THE CONFISCATION OF PROPERTy DURING THE CIVIL
WAR (1913).
14 See Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
15 See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 307 (1871); Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S.
331 (1871).
16 See Dobbins's Distilleiy, 96 U.S. at 395.
17 SeeJ.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
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Not until the 1980s did forfeiture law become a major tool in the
war on crime and drugs. Today, there are over one hundred federal
statutes covering a wide range of both civil and criminal forfeiture.
Before analyzing forfeiture law further, an important distinction must
be made between the two different types of forfeiture: civil and
criminal.
B. Criminal Versus Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding against the property itself
and not its owner. It is based upon the fiction of guilty property;18
accordingly, the guilt or innocence of the property owner is irrele-
vant. Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand, is an in personam pro-
ceeding against a defendant who forfeits nothing unless she is
convicted of a crime.
The distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture is not as
clear as the distinction between civil and criminal law. Civil law deter-
mines private rights and provides compensation for harm done to
those rights; criminal law punishes criminal offenders. However, civil
law can also punish, making the distinction between the two unclear
in some cases. Civil forfeiture almost certainly does not define private
rights, and in many cases seems only to serve as punishment. The
distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture is an important one.19
In criminal forfeiture cases, courts use a higher burden of proof stan-
dard, and more constitutional protections are provided for defend-
ants.20 Whether the legislature intends a forfeiture statute to be civil
or criminal is usually evident upon the face of the statute, 21 but this
intent is not always conclusive.
22
Between the two types, civil forfeiture has been the most criti-
cized for being unjust. This stems from situations, as in Bennis v. Mich-
igan,23 where a completely uninvolved innocent owner is punished by
the loss of her property. Criminal forfeiture, however, punishes a de-
fendant for committing a criminal offense. In most of these cases, it is
18 See id. ("the thing is primarily considered the offender").
19 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606 n.4 (1993) ("As a general matter,
this Court's decisions applying Constitutional protections to civil forfeiture proceed-
ings have adhered to this distinction between provisions that are limited to criminal
proceedings and provisions that are not.").
20 See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the due process
requirement of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to civil forfeiture
proceedings).
21 See United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814).
22 See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
23 516 U.S. 442 (1996). See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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easy to see the justice of not allowing someone to profit from her ille-
gal activity. This is where a proportionality requirement 24 comes in:
the punishment, what the owner loses, must be comparable to the
harm the owner, or the property, caused.
C. Statutory Forfeiture Provisions
1. Civil Forfeiture Statutes
The biggest expansion in civil forfeiture law, since Prohibition,
was the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act.2 5 This Act authorized the forfeiture of the illegal substance in-
volved in the commission of an offense and all instrumentalities used
in the manufacturing and distribution of the illegal substance. In
1978, the Act was amended to provide for the forfeiture of all the
proceeds from an illegal drug transaction. The 1978 amendment also
provided for an innocent owner defense.
26
The innocent owner defense protects the owner of property who
was not involved in the criminal activity and did not consent to the
property being used to commit the offense.27 To defeat a forfeiture,
the innocent owner must not have been involved in the offense, must
not have consented to the use of the property, and must not have had
any knowledge of the criminal activity.28 The innocent owner defense
is only available for those forfeitures that are specifically allowed in
the statute. 29
24 See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
25 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994).
26 "The original forfeiture provisions of the 1970 statute had closely paralleled
the early statutes used to enforce custom laws .... They generally authorized the
forfeiture of property used in the commission of criminal activity and they contained
no innocent owner defense." United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111,
122 (1993). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(1994) ("No property shall be forfeited
under this section ... by reason of any act or omission established.., to have been
committed without the knowledge of that owner or leinholder.").
27 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 n.1l (1993) ("There is nothing
inconsistent... in viewing forfeiture as punishment even though the forfeiture is
occasioned by the acts of a person other than the owner.").
28 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974) (not-
ing that civil forfeiture "impos[es] an economic penalty); Dobbins's Distillery v.
United States, 96 U.S. 395, 404 (1878) ("The acts of violation as to the penal conse-
quences to the property are to be considered just the same as if they were the acts of
the owner."); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)
("Such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner and therefore he
is properly punished by such forfeiture.").
29 Of course, the innocent owner defense is only available for civil forfeitures,
where the action is against guilty property. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (2) (1994)
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2. Criminal Forfeiture Statutes
The three main criminal forfeiture statutory provisions are the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) ,3 the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE),31 and the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLC) .32 Although criminal forfei-
ture is less controversial than civil forfeiture, courts have criticized the
broad scope of these statutes as being too expansive. 33
The courts use the broad language of RICO's criminal forfeiture
provision to combat the profitable business of criminal enterprise,3 4 as
intended by Congress. This allows the Government to seize both the
profits illegally gained by these enterprises and those profits gained
legally. Forfeiture can be of illegal proceeds from illegal activities,
property connected to the enterprise, or any interest in the
enterprise.
Criminal forfeiture under CCE, like forfeiture under RICO, al-
lows for the seizure of all proceeds from a violation, all property de-
rived from such proceeds, and all property related to the operation or
control of the illegal activity.3 5 The MLC is used for the forfeiture of
property that is "involved in" a violation, or attempted violation, of the
money-laundering statutes. Under § 982(a) (1), the definition of "in-
volved in" includes not only the subject of the offense but also the
proceeds of the offense. Therefore, the main question under this stat-
ute is whether the property is "involved in" an illegal activity. All three
of these statutes-RICO, CCE, and MLC-have been limited by the
courts to prevent encroachment on constitutionally protected rights.36
D. Constitutional Limitations on Forfeiture
Forfeiture statutes, especially civil statutes, have received substan-
tial criticism, principally for encroaching on a person's right to prop-
(setting forth an innocent owner defense to property which is forfeitable under
§ 981 (a) (1)); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6)-(7) (1994) (explicitly including lienholders as
innocent owners).
30 Criminal forfeiture for a RICO violation is available in 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994).
31 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
32 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994).
33 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 54-55
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v.
$191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1994).
34 See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) ("to remove the profit
from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his dishonest gains").
35 See United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120, 1127 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986).
36 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 555 (1993).
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erty.3 7 In many instances, the courts agree and hold that several
constitutional provisions apply to forfeiture law.38 The constitutional
protections afforded the property owner in a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing, however, are limited compared to those given to a defendant in a
criminal forfeiture prosecution. Defendants in criminal forfeiture
proceedings are given the same constitutional protections as in all
criminal prosecutions. This includes, for example, the Sixth Amend-
ment rights to a speedy trial, by ajury, with confrontation of witnesses,
and with the assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment rights also
apply to civil forfeiture cases to a lesser extent, but those cases will not
be discussed in this Case Comment.
3 9
The concept of forfeiture, whether civil or criminal, is subject to
many constitutional challenges. A minority of the Court's holdings on
these issues have provided a clear "bright line" rule that applies
equally to all forfeitures, both civil and criminal. Other decisions are
less clear and apply to only one type of forfeiture, either civil or crimi-
nal, but not to both, or to each one to differing degrees. Some cases
seem to discard the civil-criminal distinction altogether. In canvassing
these cases, it is easier to order them according to the constitutional
amendment to which they apply, and not chronologically, though this
is troublesome because the Court uses the same standards for differ-
ent amendments. The next Section will discuss the application of the
First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment's seizure provision, the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses, and
the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, to forfeiture cases.
In addition, the discussion of the Eighth Amendment will analyze the
property protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment and will com-
pare the protection the Eighth Amendment gives to life and liberty.
37 See generally Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and
Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Reform, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1254, 1257 (noting
that "[i]nnocent third parties owners, lienholders, unsecured creditors, bona fide
purchasers, business partners, corporate shareholders, joint tenants, and many
others" have all lost property to forfeiture).
38 See United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297,
1300-03 (5th Cir. 1983).
39 See generally United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (holding that forfeiture of defendant's assets,
which prevented him from hiring the attorney of his choice, does not violate the Sixth
Amendment). But see United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 480-82 (holding that the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not apply to civil forfeiture cases).
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1. The First Amendment
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... -"40 The
First Amendment challenges to forfeiture deal mainly with the forfei-
ture of pornography. It is settled law that the First Amendment does
not protect obscene material. 4' The issue is the forfeiture of nonob-
scene material that is "involved in" the obscenity violation. The
Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of nonobscene material in Alex-
ander v. United States.42 In Alexander, the defendant owned several por-
nography stores and was convicted on multiple obscenity and RICO
violations. The convictions stemmed from the possession of four ob-
scene magazines and six obscene videos. The defendant was sen-
tenced to six years in prison, fined $100,000, and his entire enterprise
was forfeited. The enterprise included his inventory at the several
stores as well as nine million dollars that he had received as proceeds
from the enterprise. The Court upheld the forfeiture under the First
Amendment, 43 holding that it did not violate the defendant's First
Amendment rights because the property was "involved in" a criminal
enterprise.
2. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment states that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . ... 44 The
Fourth Amendment is especially pertinent in forfeiture cases. The
Fourth Amendment applies to every criminal case involving a search
or a seizure, including criminal forfeiture. In 1886 the Supreme
Court held, in Boyd v. United States,45 that although in rem forfeiture
proceedings were civil, they also served in part to punish. Thus, they
were classified as "quasi-criminal" and, as such, subject to the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. The seizure provision of the Fourth Amend-
ment places limitations on the Government's ability to seize property
40 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41 See Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1966).
42 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
43 The case was remanded for examination under the Eighth Amendment. See
id. at 559.
44 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
45 116 U.S. 616 (1866).
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for a civil forfeiture proceeding.46 The strict application of this provi-
sion in criminal forfeiture cases, allowing only the seizure of property
that was illegal to possess, ended in Warden, Maryland Penitentiay v.
Hayden,47 where the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the forfeiture of "mere evidence."48 However, the constitu-
tional limitations on forfeiture do not stop with the Fourth Amend-
ment.49 Other constitutional provisions must also be examined.
3. The Fifth Amendment
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment declares that
"[n] o person .. . shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... ."5o This clause provides both proce-
dural and substantive protections. Procedurally, the Supreme Court
held that "the general rule [is] that individuals must receive notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives
them of property."5 ' Substantively, a civil in rem forfeiture does not
violate the Fifth Amendment's due process rights of an innocent
owner.52 The Court has upheld forfeitures against innocent owners
based upon "a long and unbroken line of cases hold[ing] that an
owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to
which the property is put even though the owner did not know it was
being put to such use."
53
Civil forfeiture may also be challenged under the Double Jeop-
ardy and Self-Incrimination Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Those
clauses state that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
46 See generally One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696
(1965) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the Exclusionary Rule,
apply to civil forfeiture).
47 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
48 1d at 300-01.
49 See United States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993). The
Court stated: "[I]t does not follow that the Fourth Amendment is the sole constitu-
tional provision in question when the Government seizes property subject to forfei-
ture," id. at 49, thereby refuting the Government's argument that the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to seizures for civil forfeitures. The Court went on to
hold that absent exigent circumstances due process requires notice and a hearing
before seizure of real property for purposes of civil forfeiture.
50 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
51 James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 48.
52 See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (upholding a forfeiture where
respondent's husband was convicted under a prostitution statute and the car they
owned jointly was forfeited in a civil proceeding as an instrumentality of the offense).
53 Id. at 446.
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any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ,,54 In 1971, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Boyd:55 the Self-In-
crimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture
cases.56 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, on the
other hand, does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings. 57 The
Court held that even if civil forfeitures are punitive in nature they do
not constitute "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy.58
4. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."59 The Eighth Amendment can be separated into
three distinct clauses: Bail, Excessive Fines, and Cruel and Unusual
Punishments. These are protections on the fundamental rights of life,
liberty, and property. This Section discusses constitutional limitations
placed upon the legislature by these three clauses-especially the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause-and compares the amount of protection pro-
vided to each of the three relevant fundamental rights.
a. The Bail Clause
The Bail Clause states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired. '60 The Supreme Court held, in United States v. Salerno,61 that
bail is not constitutionally required in every case.62 "The only argua-
54 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
56 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22
(1971) ("When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that
they are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved
in a criminal enterprise. It follows . . . that the Fifth Amendment's privilege may
properly be invoked in those proceedings.") (footnote omitted); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 634 (1866) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause applies to civil forfeitures when there is a possibility of future criminal pro-
ceedings); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-54 (1980).
57 See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding civil forfeiture does
not, under double jeopardy, bar subsequent criminal proceedings). But see United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-49 (1989) (holding that Double Jeopardy prohib-
its a second sanction that may not be fairly characterized as remedial).
58 See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (civil forfeitures that are punitive
in nature constitute a "fine" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment and are there-
fore limited by the Excessive Fines Clause).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
60 Id.
61 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
62 See id. at 751.
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ble substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government's
proposed conditions of release or detention not be 'excessive' ....63
If the Government seeks to withhold bail completely, the courts must
compare the detention to the Government's interest in detaining the
defendant to determine if the detention would be excessive. 64 The
Bail Clause provides protection of liberty: "In our society liberty is the
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully lim-
ited exception.
'65
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall strenuously objected to
the majority's reading that the Bail Clause did not prohibit the Gov-
ernment from detaining a defendant without a trial. This, Justice
Marshall believed, compromised the fundamental concept of ordered
liberty. Marshall noted that "[t]here could be no more eloquent dem-
onstration of the coercive power of authority to imprison upon predic-
tion, or of the dangers which the almost inevitable abuses pose to the
cherished liberties of a free society."
66
The Bail Clause has limited application: it does not guarantee
bail, nor does it work to prevent the detention (and thus secure the
liberty) of all defendants before they are tried on their guilt or inno-
cence. It also does not provide any limitation on the punishment im-
posed after a guilty verdict. Once found guilty, the defendant must
rely on the other two clauses-the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause-to prevent unjust
sentencing.
67
b. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
The most well-known Eighth Amendment Clause is the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, which states that "nor [shall] cruel and
unusual punishments [be] inflicted. ' 68 In 1976, the Supreme Court
held, in Gregg v. Georgia,69 that the death penalty is not per se uncon-
stitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,70 re-
63 Id. at 754.
64 See id.
65 I& at 755.
66 Id. at 766-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause has also been held to prevent un-
just sentencing. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996); Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298 (1995).
68 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
69 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
70 See id. (setting forth a bifurcated trial system where in the first phase the jury
decided guilt or innocence, and in a second, separate, phase the sentence was
decided).
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versing its earlier decisions on the matter.71 The Supreme Court has,
however, set detailed guidelines for the imposition of the death pen-
alty by finding limitations on the constitutionality of a death
sentence.7
2
The Supreme Court has not had such uniformity regarding the
imposition of severe prison sentences. In 1980, in Rummel v. Estelle,
73
the Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause's pro-
portionality review used in capital cases also applied to noncapital
cases, but still upheld a mandatory life sentence contained in a recidi-
vist statute.74 Then, in 1983, a 5-4 majority held, in Solem v. Helm,75
that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole under a recidivist
statute violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause because it was not constitutionally proportional to the
offense. 76 However, in 1992, in a plurality opinion in Harmelin v.
Michigan,77 the Court retreated and held that "Solem was simply wrong;
the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee." 78 As
a result, after Harmelin it is difficult to tell whether a proportionality
guarantee is contained in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Just two years after its decision in Harmelin, the Court rendered
its opinion in Alexander v. United States.79 In Alexander, the Court held
that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does con-
71 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding the death penalty
unconstitutional in the cases before the Court but not deciding the constitutionality
of the death penalty in all cases and in all circumstances).
72 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In Thompson, four
members of the Court noted that the Eighth Amendment prevents the execution of a
defendant charged for a crime committed before reaching the age of sixteen. See also
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits execution of an insane person); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (holding unconstitutional statutes that provide for mandatory death sentence
for all first-degree murders).
73 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
74 See id. (holding a mandatory life sentence under Texas recidivist statute did
not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
75 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
76 See id. at 303 ("The Constitution requires us to examine [the Defendant's]
sentence to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria,
we find that [he] has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal
conduct.").
77 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
78 Id. at 965.
79 509 U.S. 544 (1993). Petitioner was convicted of seventeen counts of obscen-
ity, five counts of engaging in selling obscene materials, and three counts of RICO,
and was sentenced to six years in prison and fined $100,000. The Government also
sought forfeiture of his pornography businesses and over nine million dollars in cash.
See id. at 547.
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tain a proportionality guarantee.80 In its opinion, however, the Court
stated, in dicta, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause re-
quired a proportionality review, but only when the sentence was
greater than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.81
Thus, given the Court's opinion in Solem, the plurality's words in
Harmelin, and the dicta in Alexander, it is difficult to tell exactly when,
or even if, a proportionality review is required under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.
c. The Excessive Fines Clause
The Excessive Fines Clause states that "nor [shall] excessive fines
[be] imposed .. .. 82 Alexander, and its companion case, Austin v.
United States,8 3 offered the first material and substantive constitutional
limitations on forfeiture under the Eighth Amendment. In Alexander,
the Eighth Circuit had upheld the forfeiture of the defendant's por-
nography businesses and nine million dollars in cash under both the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.8 4 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, stating that the Eighth Circuit had "failed to distinguish be-
tween these two components of [the] petitioner's Eighth Amendment
challenge."85 In the Court's opinion, it held for the first time that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to criminal
forfeitures.86 The Court noted that two separate analyses are required
in criminal forfeiture cases, because the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause "does not require any proportionality review of a sen-
tence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,"87
but the Excessive Fines Clause requires a proportionality review in
every case to determine if a fine is excessive.88 The Court held that a
criminal forfeiture was a "fine"8 9 as covered by the Eighth Amend-
ment. Therefore, the Court noted, these forfeitures are limited by the
80 See id. at 558; see also infta notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
81 See id.
82 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
83 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
84 Alexander v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1991).
85 Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558.
86 See id. at 548-49.
87 Id at 558.
88 See id
89 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265
(1989) ("[A]t the time of the drafting and ratification of the [Eighth] Amendment,
the word 'fine' was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense.").
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Excessive Fines Clause, which provides a proportionality guarantee.
In Alexander, the Court seems to have clearly divided the two clauses
and prescribed different standards to each. The Court based this dis-
tinction upon the idea that the two clauses serve different purposes:
the Excessive Fines Clause regulates the Government's power to ex-
tract payments as a form of punishment, while the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause regulates the "duration or conditions of
confinement."90
Austin was decided on the same day as Alexander. In Austin,9 1 the
Court extended the Excess Fines Clause to in rem forfeitures. 92 Aus-
tin changed the question that courts use to determine whether the
Eighth Amendment constitutional protections apply to a particular
forfeiture. The Court stated that "the question is not . ..whether
[the] forfeiture . .. is civil or criminal . . .but rather whether it is
punishment, '93 finding that only forfeitures designed to punish are
afforded Eighth Amendment protection. The Court noted that forfei-
ture will be deemed to serve as a punishment when it is aimed at retri-
bution or deterrence, or when it does not serve a remedial purpose.
94
The Court did acknowledge that forfeiture could serve both a punitive
and a remedial purpose;95 however, even if even one of the purposes
is to punish, the Excessive Fines Clause would apply to limit the forfei-
ture. 96 The Excessive Fines Clause thus applies to all forfeitures, civil
and criminal, that "can only be explained as serving in part to
punish."
9 7
90 Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558.
91 Petitioner was sentenced to seven years in prison for violating South Dakota's
drug laws. The State then commenced an in rem proceeding against petitioner's
mobile home and car repair shop. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604
(1993).
92 See id. at 622 ("We therefore conclude that forfeiture under these conditions
constitutes 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,' and, as such, is
subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.") (cita-
tions omitted).
93 Id. at 610.
94 To determine whether or not civil forfeiture constituted a punishment, the
Court looked at the nature of forfeiture at the time the Eighth Amendment was rati-
fied, and whether the statute in question was "so understood" to be a punishment
today. See id. at 621.
95 See id. at 610.
96 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (noting that when a for-
feiture serves to punish, that does not exclude the possibility that it serves other
purposes).
97 Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
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The Court remanded both Alexander and Austin to the Eighth
Circuit to determine if the forfeitures were excessive. 98 Unfortu-
nately, neither opinion set forth any guidance for determining exces-
siveness 99 -the court refused to provide a test for lower courts to use
in determining whether a particular forfeiture violates the Excessive
Fines Clause. As a result, after Austin and Alexander, the circuit courts
developed three different tests to determine whether a forfeiture is
excessive: (1) the instrumentality test; (2) the proportionality test; and
(3) the hybrid of the instrumentality and the proportionality tests. 10 0
i. The Instrumentality Test
The instrumentality test gained guidance and support from Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence in Austin.1 1 Justice Scalia noted that in rem
forfeitures are not a fixed amount, but rather the value of the prop-
erty that has been "tainted" by a crime. He argued that the actual
value of the property was irrelevant to the excessiveness analysis,
0 2
noting "[t]he question is not how much the confiscated property is
worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close enough rela-
tion to the offense.' 0 3 To be constitutional under the instrumentality
test, the property forfeited must have a close enough relationship to
the crime that the property is deemed an instrumentality of the crime
and is therefore rendered guilty.10 4 Despite Scalia's concurring opin-
ion, the majority in Austin did not specifically endorse the instrumen-
tality test. Rather, it noted that while it would not rule out the
relevance of a relationship between the crime and the property, it also
would not limit the lower courts to only using that factor. 05
98 See id. at 623; Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993).
99 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622-23 ("Prudence dictates that we allow the lower
courts to consider that question in the first instance."). Although the majority in
Austin did not give any test for excessiveness, Justice Scalia set forth an instrumentality
test in his concurrence. See id. at 627-26 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100 See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
101 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102 See id. at 627-28 ("Unlike monetary fines, statutory in rem forfeitures have tra-
ditionally been fixed, not by determining the appropriate value of the penalty in rela-
tion to the committed offense, but by determining what property has been 'tainted'
by unlawful use, to which the value of the property is irrelevant.").
103 Id. at 628.
104 See United States v. $1,020,378.05 of United States Currency, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13152 (9th Cir. May 11, 1994) (holding that double jeopardy does not bar a
forfeiture of property that was an instrumentality of the crime).
105 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 623 n.15.
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The Fourth Circuit, following Scalia's analysis, uses an instrumen-
tality test. In United States v. Chandler,10 6 the court applied a three-part
instrumentality test. Under part one, the court considers the connec-
tion between the offense and the property, and the role that the prop-
erty has in the offense. Part two of the inquiry analyzes the culpability
of the owner of the property. Finally, part three separates the prop-
erty actually involved in the offense from the property that is not
involved.107
ii. The Proportionality Test
The proportionality test was derived mainly from two cases: Solem
v. Helm and Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc..'08 The first decision, Solem, analyzed excessiveness under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 0 9 using three factors to de-
termine whether a punishment is "grossly disproportionate"'"10 to the
crime, and therefore excessive. The first Solem step is to analyze the
gravity of the offense and compare it to the harshness of the punish-
ment. In the second step, the punishment imposed is compared to
punishments imposed for crimes with relatively the same gravity of
offense. Finally, the third step compares the punishment given to
punishments for the same offense in different jurisdictions."'
Although the Supreme Court criticized Solem, in Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 1 2 the factors still seem to be good law for determining if a pun-
ishment is grossly disproportional to the offense."13 That is, Harmelin
only questioned the holding in Solem that the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause requires a proportionality analysis.
106 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding a sufficient nexus, under the instrumen-
tality analysis of the Eighth Amendment, between defendant's 33 acre farm and his
drug operation to support forfeiture of the entire property).
107 See id.
108 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
109 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment a life sentence without the possibility of parole when defendant
was convicted for writing a bad check).
110 The majority in Bajakajian uses this term for determining excessiveness under
the Eighth Amendment, but seems to alter the test. See infra Part III.
111 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92.
112 "The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the
crime and the sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportional' to the crime." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991).
113 The plurality in Harmelin seems to hold that proportionality is not the correct
test under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, but the majority in Bajakajian
seems to reestablish the relevance of proportionality with regard to the Excessive
Fines Clause. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
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Additional support for the proportionality test came from Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris."4 In Browning-Fer-
ris, which was a civil suit, the defendant was found to have violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act and the jury awarded the plaintiff over six mil-
lion dollars in punitive damages." 5 The defendant challenged the
punitive award, claiming it was excessive under the Eighth Amend-
ment.116 The Court, however, refused to extend any Eighth Amend-
ment coverage to a civil suit where the Government was not one of the
parties and did not receive a portion of the judgment. Justice
O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part, n 7 arguing that the
Eighth Amendment should apply, and set forth a three-prong test to
determine if a fine was excessive. The Eighth Amendment analysis for
excessiveness set forth by Justice O'Connor was a modification of the
Solem three-part test, which specifically applies to the Excessive Fines
Clause." 8 Like the Solem test, Justice O'Connor's test required the
courts to analyze the gravity of the offense and the severity of the pun-
ishment sought, and to compare the punishment sought against the
defendant to punishments imposed in similar civil and criminal cases
in that jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions. 119 Justice O'Connor's
test then added to the previous analysis by requiring the courts to give
"substantial deference" to the legislature when particular sanctions
are set forth in legislation.120
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights,'2' ex-
pressly adopted a proportionality test and rejected the instrumentality
test. This test uses multiple factors to determine if the culpability of
the owner is proportional to the property forfeited, including: the
value of the property, the nexus between the property and the of-
fense, the role that the owner of the property played in the offense,
the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the owner, and the harm
caused. This list is not exhaustive; the analysis is flexible, allowing the
district courts to consider the individual circumstances of each case.
114 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
115 See id. at 262.
116 See id. at 297.
117 See id. at 282-301 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Justice O'Connor's concurrence
is not relevant to this Case Comment.
118 See id. at 300-01.
119 See id.
120 The majority in Bajakajian also used the requirement of giving "substantial def-
erence" to the legislature. See infra Part III.
121 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing on other grounds the forfeiture of de-
fendant's house after she confessed to three counts of selling a controlled substance
from the house, but specifically rejecting the district court's use of an instrumentality
test under the Eighth Amendment).
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iii. The Hybrid Test
Courts that adopted a third test, a hybrid test, have used an analy-
sis that looks at both the relationship of the property to the crime (an
instrumentality analysis) and the gravity of the offense compared to
the harshness of the forfeiture (a proportionality analysis).
22
The Ninth Circuit adopted such a two-prong test in United States
v. Real Property Located in El Dorado County.' 23 This test is a hybrid of
the instrumentality test adopted by the Fourth Circuit and the propor-
tionality test adopted by the Eighth Circuit. The first prong of the
test, the instrumentality prong, requires the Government to show a
"substantial connection between the property, or the appropriate por-
tion thereof, and the offense."1 24 If the Government can show this
connection, the burden then shifts to the defendant to "show that for-
feiture of his property would be grossly disproportionate given the na-
ture and extent of his criminal culpability."'125 The Ninth Circuit
applied this hybrid test in United States v. Bajakajian.1
26
III. UNITED STATES V. BAJAKJIAN
Bajakajian involved a criminal forfeiture, in which the Court
found that the respondent caused minimal harm for which he was
severely punished. The culpability of the respondent did not justify
the forfeiture of the entire amount. The Court did more in this case
than just minimize the severity of a violation of the reporting statute;
it changed the requirements of forfeiture law. Surprisingly, in a case
where the Court struck down a forfeiture as unconstitutional, it might
actually have loosened the constitutional reins on forfeiture.
A. Case History
On June 9, 1994, a California gas station owner, Hosep
Bajakajian, and his family were preparing to board an international
flight from Los Angeles International Airport to Syria. A United
States Customs inspector informed him that he was required to dis-
close all cash he was taking out of the country in excess of $10,000.
122 For an example of the hybrid analysis, see the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334 (9th Cir. 1996). See infra notes 136-46.
123 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding the forfeiture issue for the district
court to determine whether there was a sufficient nexus between defendant's farm
and his drug operation, and if so whether forfeiture of the entire farm would be
proportional to defendant's criminal culpability).
124 Id. at 985.
125 Id.
126 84 F.3d 334 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Bajakajian said he had only $8,000, and his wife $7,000. In fact, cus-
toms inspectors discovered a total of $357,144 in Bajakajian's luggage,
including $100,000 in a hidden compartment at the bottom of his
carry-on bag. Mr. Bajakajian admitted that he constructed a false bot-
tom in his bag to hide the cash. Because he failed to declare the cur-
rency in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316, the Customs Service seized all
of the money.
27
The Government indicted Bajakajian on three charges: (1) fail-
ing to report that he was transporting over $10,000 in cash out of the
country in violation of § 5316(a) (1) (A),128 and in doing so, willfully
violating § 5322 (a);129 (2) making a false statement to a customs offi-
cial in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; and (3) seeking forfeiture of the
entire $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1). 130 Bajakajian pleaded
guilty to count one, and the Government dropped count two. On
count three, the defendant waived his right to a jury trial and, follow-
ing a bench trial, the district court ordered forfeiture of $15,000.131
The district court found that the entire $357,144 was "involved in" the
offense and therefore subject to forfeiture under § 982(a) (1). In fact,
§ 982 (a) (1) calls for the forfeiture of the entire amount of undeclared
money, but the district court refused to do so, finding that the money
was the proceeds of lawful activities' 32 and that the respondent will-
127 See Brief for the United States, Bajakajian (No. 96-1487).
128 Section 5316(a) provides:
[A] person or an agent or bailee of the person shall file a report... when
the person, agent, or bailee knowingly-
(1) transports, is about to transport, or has transported, monetary in-
struments of more then $10,000 at one time-
(A) from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the
United States;...
31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (1994).
129 "A person willfully violating this subchapter.., shall be fined not more than
$250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years or both." 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)
(1994).
130 "The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in viola-
tion of section ... 5316.... shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any
property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such
property." 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1) (1994).
131 The Supreme Court did not decide the question of whether the forfeiture of
$15,000 was excessive. See United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 n.11
(1998).
132 The Supreme Court's dissenting opinion argued that this conclusion was erro-
neous. Bajakajian could not account for where he got the money. "He... told cus-
tom inspectors... Ajemian lent him about $200,000. Ajemian denied this. A month
later, respondent said. .. Faroutan had lent him $170,000. Faroutan, however, said
he had not made the loan and respondent had asked him to lie. Six months later,
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fully concealed the money because of "cultural differences" that
caused him to distrust the Government.
1 33
The court sentenced Bajakajian to three years probation and or-
dered a fine of $5,000, the maximum allowed under the sentencing
guidelines. However, the court found the fine alone to be inade-
quate, and stated that the forfeiture of $15,000 would "make up for
what [it thought] a reasonable fine should be."1 3 4 The district court
also found that the mandated forfeiture of the entire $357,144 would
have been "'extraordinarily harsh' and 'grossly disproportionate' to
the offense in question, and would therefore violate the Excessive
Fines Clause.
1' 35
B. Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Seeking forfeiture of the entire amount, as allowed by
§ 982(a) (1), the Government appealed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the ruling of the district court.' 36 Relying on the hybrid in-
strumentality-proportionality test the court developed in United States
v. Real Property Located in El Dorado County,'37 the Ninth Circuit held
that in order for a forfeiture to be constitutional under the Excessive
Fines Clause, it must satisfy both prongs of a two-prong test: "(1) the
property forfeited [must be] an 'instrumentality' of the crime commit-
ted, and (2) the value of the property [must be] proportional to the
culpability of the owner. " 138 The court found that the money did not
satisfy the instrumentality prong of the test, and therefore held the
forfeiture was unconstitutional. 13 9
In doing so, the court made two crucial distinctions. First, it dis-
tinguished an instrumentality of a crime from the essence of a crime.
In this case, the court reasoned that the money was not an instrumen-
tality of the crime merely because it was required to carry out the ille-
gal offense, but found instead that it was the essence of the crime.
respondent resurrected the fable of the alleged loan from Ajemian .... " Bajakajian,
118 S. Ct. at 2045 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133 See id. (quoting the transcript from the district court trial, Tr. 61-62 (Jan. 19,
1995)).
134 Id. at 2032. (quoting Tr. 63 (Jan. 1995)).
135 Id.
136 United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 338 (9th Cir. 1996).
137 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995). See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
138 Bajakajian, 84 F.3d at 336.
139 See id. at 338.
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The court went further and held that because it was the essence of the
crime, it could not be an instrumentality of it.140
Second, the court held that the unreported money was not con-
traband. To do this, the court had to distinguish money used in a
reporting violation from the property in a smuggling violation. In
other words, it had to separate the present facts from those in One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States,141 which involved a
civil forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1497. In One Lot, the Court held
that the forfeiture of undeclared property was remedial, not puni-
tive, 142 reasoning that the forfeiture was designed to compensate the
Government for investigation and other expenses involved.
To distinguish this case from Bajakajian, the court relied on the
fact that it was legal to possess and transport the money. The only
crime involved in Bajakajian was the "failure to provide informa-
tion"14 3-"[t]he crime [was] not the illegal possession, transportation
or smuggling of dutiable items."144 Because the money was found to
be legally possessed, no duty would have been imposed if the respon-
dent had reported it. On the other hand, the defendant in One Lot
would have been charged a duty if he had reported the stones. The
key difference-what made the stones contraband, the court said-is
that the Government was deprived of revenue. The court believed
that it was this difference that made the stones in One Lot both an
instrumentality of the offense and contraband, while the unreported
money in Bajakajian was neither.
Using this distinction, the court noted that money used in a re-
porting violation under § 5316 can never satisfy the constitutional re-
quirements of the Eighth Amendment, because it is not an
instrumentality of the crime. Since it could never satisfy the instru-
mentality prong of the excessiveness test, the Ninth Circuit held that
forfeiture of money used in a § 5316 violation was per se unconstitu-
tional.1 45 The Supreme Court relied on some of the same distinctions
140 The Court used the example of a car used to transport unreported currency
out of the country as what would be an instrumentality of a reporting violation. See id.
at 338 n.7.
141 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (holding that forfeiting undeclared goods that were con-
cealed in luggage and imposing a fine equal to the value of the goods was a remedial
not punitive sanction).
142 See id. at 237.
143 Bajakajian, 84 F.3d at 337.
144 Id. at 338.
145 See id.
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as the Ninth Circuit when it justified finding the full forfeiture to be
"grossly disproportionate" to the offense. 146
C. The Supreme Court Decision
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court did not think it was
necessary to determine whether the property was an instrumentality of
the offense. The only relevant question, in the majority's opinion, was
the one that the circuit court never addressed: Did the punishment fit
the crime? The majority said no; the punishment in this case was too
severe given the nature of the crime committed. The dissent, on the
other hand, argued that not only was the respondent's money an in-
strumentality of the crime, but that it was also relevant to the question
of whether the forfeiture was constitutional. The dissent agreed that
proportionality was also a pertinent question and it adopted the test
the majority used to determine proportionality. The dissent did not
agree with the way the majority applied the test in this case, however,
stating that the majority had not followed its own advice. The majority
opinion attempted to narrow the Government's power to forfeit prop-
erty, while the dissenting opinion argued that the holding had the
opposite effect.
1. Majority Opinion
To begin the analysis, the majority reiterated the Court's previous
holding in Austin that a fine under the Eighth Amendment is a pay-
ment to the Government as a punishment. 147 The majority had little
trouble deciding that the forfeiture of the respondent's cash served to
punish him for his violation of the reporting statute, 148 and it easily
combatted the Government's arguments. The majority then had to
decide if this fine was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. In
doing this, the majority set forth a new, specific test for courts to use
in determining excessiveness.
a. Defining Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1)
The majority analyzed the history of forfeiture law's purpose,
tracing its evolution from English common law to its decision in Aus-
tin. Following the precedent set in Austin, the Court looked at the
nature of the forfeiture to determine whether it was a "fine" as cov-
ered by the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that forfeiture of
146 See infra notes 165-72.
147 SeeAustin v. United States, 501 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993).
148 See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2033.
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currency under § 982(a) (1) was a fine because it was imposed to pun-
ish the owner. Therefore, as a fine it was limited by the Excessive
Fines Clause. It was evident to the majority that this forfeiture served
to punish the respondent; it required a conviction under the report-
ing statute, in addition to both a fine and a prison sentence.149
The Government tried to show that the forfeiture was not a fine,
and therefore not covered by the Eighth Amendment. It made three
arguments to support this contention: (1) the forfeiture served a re-
medial interest and was therefore not punishment; (2) the forfeiture
was a traditional forfeiture of tainted property; and (3) the money was
an instrumentality of the crime. 150
To refute the Government's first argument that the forfeiture
served a remedial interest, the Court applied One Lot, where the Court
held that forfeiture had a remedial purpose if it was "brought to ob-
tain compensation or indemnity."' 51 The Government did not argue
that the money would repay the Government for its investigation and
enforcement expenses, but argued that because full forfeiture would
be an efficient deterrent, the forfeiture served an important remedial
purpose. The Government conceded, however, that deterrence is a
traditional goal of punishment. The Court, again relying on Austin,
stated that if any part of the sanction is aimed to punish, the Eighth
Amendment applies, regardless of the other goals. Therefore, the is-
sue of whether the forfeiture in this case served a remedial purpose
did not need to be decided. 5 2
The Government's second argument was almost as futile, main-
taining that the forfeiture was constitutional because it was a tradi-
tional forfeiture of tainted property. The Court concluded a lengthy
analysis of the history of forfeiture by classifying forfeiture under
§ 982(a) (1) as an in personam forfeiture and therefore subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny.153 This argument does not rely on Aus-
tin, where the Court held that the question was not whether the forfei-
ture was in rem or in personam, but rather whether it was punitive or
remedial. The Court had already found that the forfeiture was puni-
tive so it did not readdress the question, but it did acknowledge in a
footnote that the relevant distinction was the one presented in
Austin.154
149 See id.
150 See id. at 2034-37.
151 Id. at 2034 (quoting BLAcK's L.w DICIoNARY 1293 (6th ed. (1990)).
152 See id. at 2036.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 2036 n.6 ("Because some recent federal forfeiture laws have blurred
the traditional distinction between civil ... and criminal... forfeiture, we have held
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Finally, the Court addressed the Government's argument that the
forfeiture was constitutional because the money was an instrumental-
ity of the crime. The Government argued that the currency was an
instrumentality of the crime because without it there would be no
crime. The Court did not believe that precedent could support this
definition of "instrumentality," and refused to accept it, stating that an
instrumentality of a crime is forfeited as guilty property only in an in
rem proceeding, never in an in personam forfeiture. Therefore, be-
cause this was the latter, "it is ... irrelevant whether respondent's
currency is an instrumentality; the forfeiture is punitive, and the test
for the excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture involves solely a propor-
tionality determination."1 55 In a footnote, the Court clarified the is-
sue by adding that the currency was not an instrumentality of the
crime:
The currency in question is not an instrumentality in any event.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the existence of the currency as
a "precondition" to the reporting requirement did not make it an
"instrumentality" of the offense. We agree; the currency is merely
the subject of the crime of failure to report. Cash in a suitcase does
not facilitate the commission of that crime as, for example, an auto-
mobile facilitates the transportation of goods concealed to avoid
taxes. In the latter instance, the property is the actual means by
which the criminal act is committed.
156
This part of the opinion characterized the forfeiture in question as
punitive and therefore subject to Eighth Amendment analysis. The
Court then held that, because the forfeiture was meant to punish the
respondent, it was "irrelevant whether [the] currency is an instrumen-
tality"1 57 of the crime, and that the test for excessiveness is "solely a
proportionality determination. 158
This holding settled the inconsistency that existed between the
circuit courts and provided a uniform standard by which to judge
every punitive forfeiture. The Court then proceeded to do what it had
refused to do in both Austin and Alexander; it provided a test and rele-
vant criteria that the lower courts should use to determine the consti-
tutionality of a punitive forfeiture.
that a... forfeiture is a 'fine' for Eighth Amendment purposes if it constitutes punish-
ment even in part regardless of whether [it] is styled as in rem or in personam.").
155 Id. at 2036.
156 Id. at 2036 n.9.
157 Id. at 2036.
158 Id.
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b. Defining Excessiveness
The Court based its excessiveness test on the idea that "[t]he
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of
the offense that it is designed to punish."' 59 The value of the property
forfeited, or the harm caused to the defendant by the forfeiture, must
be proportional to the gravity of the offense committed: "a punitive
forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly dispropor-
tional to the gravity of a defendant's offense."' 60 The Court was un-
able to find, in the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a
definition of how disproportionate a forfeiture had to be in order to
classify as excessive; therefore, it relied on outside sources to develop
criteria to determine excessiveness. One of the sources utilized was
the proportionality analysis developed under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause; the other source was the general history of the
judicial system.
Basing its opinion on decisions under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, the Court found that the role of determining
appropriate punishments belonged to the legislature. Stating that
'Judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong
in the first instance to the legislature,"' 61 the Court noted that the
judicial system could only serve as a check upon the legislature's de-
termination. Courts, therefore, should give great deference to the
sanctions prescribed by Congress in the statute.
162
Based on the nature of the American court system, the Court ac-
knowledged that "any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a
particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.' 63 Support
for this theory can also be found in the standards used in Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause cases to determine appropriate punish-
ments. Based on these findings the Court ruled against requiring a
strict proportionality between the amount of the punitive forfeiture
and the gravity of the criminal offense, and instead adopted the stan-
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c. Applying Excessiveness
Deferring to the legislature, the Court noted that the statute in
this case called for the forfeiture of all the money involved in the of-
fense. 165 This required the entire $357,114 to be forfeited. However,
the Court concluded that, under the gross disproportionality stan-
dard, the forfeiture of the entire $357,144 would be unconstitutional.
The Court based this decision on the facts of the case, noting that
the violation was "solely a reporting offense"' 66 not connected to any
other criminal offense, and that the harm caused was trivial. The
Court greatly minimized the violation of the reporting statute, and
found it to be only the withholding of information. It also found that,
because the respondent was not within the class of persons the statute
was aimed at punishing-money launderers and drug dealers-his of-
fense was not serious.
The Court then examined the punishment prescribed in the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. Under the Guidelines the maximum fine possible
was $5,000, with a maximum of six months in prison. 1 6 7 The Court
noted that "Is] uch penalties confirm a minimal level of culpability."'
68
In a footnote, the Court analyzed the maximum penalties authorized
by the legislature in the statute:
In considering an offense's gravity, the other penalties that the Leg-
islature has authorized are certainly relevant evidence.
Here .... Congress authorized a maximum fine of $250,000 plus
five years' imprisonment for willfully violating the statutory report-
ing requirement, and this suggests that it did not view the reporting
offense as a trivial one. That the maximum fine and Guideline sen-
tence to which respondent was subject were but a fraction of the
penalties authorized, however, undercuts any argument based solely
on the statute, because they show that respondent's culpability rela-
tive to other potential violators of the reporting provision-tax
evaders, drug kingpins, or money launderers, for example-is small
indeed. This disproportion is telling notwithstanding the fact that a
separate Guideline provision permits forfeiture if mandated by stat-
165 "The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense ... shall
order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, in-
volved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property." 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1) (1994).
166 Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2038.
167 See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5E1.2 (1994). But see 18
U.S.C. § 982(a) (1) (1994) (authorizing maximum fine of $250,000 and up to five
years in prison).
168 Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2038.
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ute. That Guideline, moreover, cannot override the constitutional
requirement of proportionality review.'
69
Finally, the Court distinguished this case from One Lot, stating
that "One Lot... differs from this case in the most fundamental re-
spect.' 170 The Court viewed the forfeiture in One Lot as being "en-
tirely remedial and thus non-punitive, primarily because it 'provided a
reasonable form of liquidated damages' to the Government."' 7 1 Like
the forfeiture in Bajakajian, the forfeiture in One Lot was also a
method of reimbursing the Government for investigation and en-
forcement costs of patrolling customs. But the Court thought that
this fact was irrelevant and never decided if the forfeiture in
Bajakajian had a remedial purpose, because even punitive forfeitures
can be used to reimburse the Government.
172
2. The Dissent
Justice Kennedy, author of the dissent, was disturbed by the possi-
ble consequences of the decision. "At issue is a fine Congress fixed in
the amount of the currency respondent sought to smuggle or to trans-
port without reporting. If a fine calibrated with this accuracy fails the
Court's test, its decision portends serious disruption of a vast range of
statutory fines.' 7 3 Kennedy found it more disturbing that, since the
Court held that remedial forfeitures are not subject to analysis under
the Eighth Amendment, there is no limit to how disproportional the
amount forfeited can be with regards to the offense committed. The
169 I. at 2038-39 n.14.
170 Id. at 2041 n.19.
171 Id
172 An important factor in the dissent's argument is that this case cannot be distin-
guished from One Lot. The only difference between the two cases is that one offense
resulted in a failure to pay a small fine to the Government. The forfeiture in One Lot
was deemed to be remedial because it involved the failure to pay a duty owed to the
Government, and because it repaid the Government for their expenses in patrolling
and enforcing their custom regulations which were in place to prevent this type of
conduct. The dissent focused on historic customs cases where the forfeiture was
greatly disproportional to the gravity of the offense, and "[mi]any [of these] offenses
did not require a failure to pay a duty at all." Id. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that the majority labeled these forfeitures as "nonpunitive and
thus not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, though they are indistinguishable from
the fine in this case." Id. The dissent could not find any facts in the case that would
prevent it from being remedial under One Lot. The real distinction, Justice Kennedy
stated, was that one case involved an in personam forfeiture, which the majority classi-
fied as a fine, while the other was an in rem forfeiture that was not a fine. Justice
Kennedy expressed a fear that this provided a way around the Excessive Fines Clause.
173 Id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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dissent found that the majority had used the same analysis to deter-
mine whether a fine was a punishment as it had used to determine
whether that punishment was excessive. If the only test is whether a
forfeiture is punishment, then every forfeiture that serves to punish
will be unconstitutional and every forfeiture that does not punish will
be constitutional. "In the majority's universe, a fine is not a punish-
ment even if it is much larger than the money owed. This confuses
whether a fine is excessive with whether it is a punishment."'174
The dissent also argued that the majority's finding that the instru-
mentality test was irrelevant could not be supported by precedent.
The dissent did agree with both the holding that proportionality is an
important analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause and the standards
the majority gave to help determine excessiveness. It argued that the
majority did not follow these standards, however, and therefore got
the wrong results.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's disposal of the in-
strumentality requirement. "The majority suggests in rem forfeitures
of the instrumentalities of crimes are not fines at all. The point of the
instrumentality theory is to distinguish goods having a 'close enough
relationship to the offense' from those incidentally related to it."
I75
Criticizing the majority's failure to analyze instrumentality forfeitures
under the Eighth Amendment and its failure to find that the money
was an instrumentality of this crime, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[t] he
cash was notjust incidentally related to the offense of cash smuggling.
It [was] essential, whereas the car is not .... Even if there were a clear
distinction between instrumentalities and incidental objects, when the
Court invokes the distinction it gets the results backwards.' 76
The dissent agreed with the test the majority used for excessive-
ness, but not its application. The majority stressed the fact that the
currency was itself lawful to possess. The dissent pointed out that this
fact adds nothing to the argument that the forfeiture was excessive
because, had the currency been unlawful to possess, its forfeiture
would have been purely remedial. "The cash was lawful to own, but
this fact shows only that the forfeiture was a fine; it cannot also prove
that the fine was excessive. '17 7 The dissent went on to conclude that
"the lawfulness of the money shows at most that the forfeiture was a
fine, it cannot at the same time prove that the fine was excessive." 178
174 Id.
175 Id. at 2043.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 2044.
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Justice Kennedy also agreed that substantial deference should be
paid to Congress when determining whether punishment is appropri-
ate, but found that the majority did not give any deference to Con-
gress. The dissent based this argument on the way that the majority
analyzed the punishment that Congress had prescribed-it used a
$5,000 fine to gauge excessiveness of the forfeiture, but the statute
authorized a fine much larger than $5,000, and the forfeiture was in
addition to a fine. "The fine thus supplements the forfeiture; it does
not replace it.'u 79 The majority also stressed the fact that respondent
committed no other crime, and therefore found his offense less seri-
ous. The dissent thought that the offense was a serious one in itself
and, because the statute prescribes more severe penalties when other
offenses have been committed, Congress must have agreed.
Thus, the dissent argued that the majority provided courts a way
around the Eighth Amendment by failing to apply the Eighth Amend-
ment at all to remedial forfeitures. The dissent noted that by making
the analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause so strict, the Court
might have encouraged lawmakers to avoid it all together.
IV. EFrcr OF BAJAKAJL4J
Several questions remain unanswered after Bajakajian. Was
Bajakajian really a victory for the Government? The defendant may
have won his money, but in the process the Government won a more
lenient constitutional standard; the Government no longer has to
prove that the object being forfeited is an instrumentality of the of-
fense. The standard presented by the Court now requires the Govern-
ment to show merely that the forfeiture is "substantially proportional"
to the offense, which is a much lower standard than strict proportion-
ality. Also, Bajakajian involved a criminal in personam forfeiture. Did
the Court intend the same test to be used for in rem forfeitures?
Based on the Court's holding, the distinction between criminal and
civil forfeiture seems moot and the real question now is whether the
forfeiture is remedial or punitive. The dissent seems to believe the
majority removed all remedial forfeitures from Eighth Amendment
review; if so, then the dissent is correct in fearing the ramifications of
Bajakajian. Instead of limiting the use of forfeiture by striking down
its use in reporting violations, the Court might have made available an
entire and seemingly unlimited field of forfeiture.
Bajakajian seems to have greatly expanded the constitutional pro-
tections afforded to the right of property, but does it do so at the
179 IM
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expense of our liberty protections? The dissent argued that in Eng-
land "[t] he main purpose of the ban on excessive fines was to prevent
the King from assessing unpayable fines to keep his enemies in
debtor's prison."180 This was the source of our Eighth Amendment.
Thus, the Excessive Fines Clause was premised on the protection of
liberty, not property-"the Court's restrictive approach could subvert
this purpose. Under the Court's holding, legislatures may rely on
mandatory prison sentences in lieu of fines."' 8 1 All three clauses of
the Eighth Amendment, when read on their face, serve to protect lib-
erty. As applied, however, the Eighth Amendment provides greater
protections to life and property. Liberty seems to be a forgotten
purpose.
No one questions the importance of the protections afforded to
life. But how can the courts justify the protection of property over
liberty? One explanation for the Court's zeal in applying the Eighth
Amendment to property protections is that forfeitures are not as com-
mon as prison sentences. The vast majority of forfeitures are of con-
traband and, therefore, uncontested.
The Government simply cannot keep up with the court system
when it extensively uses the forfeiture provisions. Forfeiture laws that
started as "zero tolerance" laws are often relaxed because of the
problems encountered in cases involving an innocent owner. "Every
case, it seem[s], had extenuating circumstances." 1 82 These extenuat-
ing circumstances require a case-by-case analysis. "Such crackdowns
have been highly popular with politicians and law-enforcement offi-
cials, but after the klieg-light hype, the programs are usually quietly
dumped or throttled back."' 83 The Federal Government's forfeiture
program for drug offences, announced in 1988 by the Custom's Ser-
vice Commissioner, William von Raab, is one example of such a cut-
back. "'There will be no mercy,' he vowed [when the program was
announced]. And for a while it seemed to be true .... But within 18
months the program . . . evolv[ed] into a relatively lenient approach
[where] people [were] cited and released without any confiscation of
their property."'1 8
4
Every conviction in a criminal case involves the right of the de-
fendant's liberty; the Government cannot change that. To prevent
the judiciary from having to do a case-by-case analysis to account for
180 Id. at 2046.
181 Id.
182 David Johnson, Reprising Zero Tolerance: History Shows That Tough Talk Is Cheap,
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every extenuating circumstance, the Court left those protections to
the legislature. The need for protecting liberty is so great, and the
cases involved so numerous, that the only way to handle them is
through legislation. The Court has not forgotten our liberty; it has
left it in other hands.
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